[DOWNLOAD] "Utica Lloyds of Texas v. Mitchell" by Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Utica Lloyds of Texas v. Mitchell
- Author : Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
- Release Date : January 15, 1998
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 55 KB
Description
Utica Lloyds of Texas ("Utica") brought this diversity suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act (the "Federal DJA"), 28 U.S.C. §Â§ 2201-02, against Eric Mitchell, The Mitchell Company, Anderson, Wormley, Mitchell & Hunt, Inc. and Wormley, Mitchell & Associates, Inc. (collectively, the "Mitchell Defendants") seeking construction of a policy issued by Utica, and a determination whether it had the duty to defend and indemnify the Mitchell Defendants in an underlying state court suit. Following an order by the federal district court determining that Utica had a duty to defend the Mitchell Defendants, the Mitchell Defendants sought attorneys fees pursuant to the Texas version of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (the "Texas DJA"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.001, et seq. The district court denied the request for attorneys fees, perceiving itself bound by our decision in Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 975 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1992), which found that attorneys fee awards against certain insurers should be denied in Texas declaratory judgment actions. We affirm, but for a different reason. The district court in the instant case relied on a statement in Bituminous that Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 38.006 "exempts certain insurers from payment of attorneys fees in declaratory judgment actions." Bituminous, 975 F.3d at 1133. The court apparently interpreted Bituminous as a broad holding applying to any declaratory judgment arising under Texas law. Bituminous, however, involved an award of attorneys fees under § 38.001(8), which provides for such fees for claims on "an oral or written contract," and never addressed the provision for attorneys fees under § 37.009 of the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act, while the Mitchell Defendants in the instant case base their claim for fees solely on § 37.009. Furthermore, § 38.006 simply provides that Chapter 38 "does not apply to a contract issued by an insurer that is subject to" one of five provisions. Accordingly, Bituminous limits only the availability of attorneys fees sought under Chapter 38, and is not relevant to the issue before this court--whether the Mitchell Defendants are entitled to attorneys fees under § 37.009 in a federal declaratory judgment action arising under diversity.